Abstract-This paper studies competitive information spread with confirmation bias in the cyber-social networks that comprises individuals in social networks and competitive information sources in cyber layer. The competitive information spread is formulated as a zero-sum game between the competitive information sources, whose pure Nash equilibrium is demonstrated to exist. The derived Nash equilibrium depends on the innate opinions, social network topology and parameters of confirmation bias. Nash equilibriums in the scenarios of neutral and extremal group of innate opinions are also investigated. Numerical examples in the context of the well-known Krackhardt's advice network are provided to demonstrate the correctness of theory results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Opinion formation in social networks has attracted significant attentions, and there exists a rich literature on dynamics of opinion evolution, see e.g., [1] - [4] . This paper considers the dynamics of cyber-social networks proposed in [5] , [6] , that is adapted from DeGroot model [1] , DeGroot-Friedkin model [2] and Hegselmann-Krause model [3] . The considered social network model [5] , [6] comprises important factors on opinion evolution: (i) subconscious bias, (ii) conformity, (iii) confirmation bias. This paper studies competitive information spread in the cyber-social networks. In recent years, different forms of competitive information spread have been studied in social networks. Dhamal et al. [7] incorporated opponent stubborn agents into DeGroot-Friedkin model, where the cost function is the sum of individuals' expressed opinions that means individuals' opinions have identical importance/influence in the decision making of competitive camps. Proskurnikov et al. [4] proposed a opinion dynamics with hostile camps, who have negative influence on the opinion evolution of the controlled individuals. By the similar polar evolution mechanism, Xia et al. [8] proposed a novel model of trust-mistrust social networks. Employing a diffusion dynamics, Eshghi et al. [9] studied optimal allocating of a finite budget across several advertising channels. However, all of these studied competitive problems [4] , [7] - [9] ignored individual confirmation bias that has recently gained revived interest due to its role in the spread of misinformation, particularly due to its impact on creating an environment for misinformation to thrive in.
We formulate the competitive information spread with confirmation bias as a zero-sum game. It is well-known that indi-Y. Mao viduals do not have identical influences in social community, see e.g., electoral college in US presidential election, more members of congress a state owns usually contribute to more electors for the state. Inspired by this, we incorporate the eigenvector centralities that measure individuals' influences into the cost function of the game, such that the competitive information sources unequally treat individuals' opinions according to their influences in social community.
In this paper, building on the zero-sum game. We first investigate the existence of pure Nash equilibrium. We next derive the pure Nash equilibrium through solving the min-max strategy. The obtained pure strategy depends on individuals' innate opinions, the social network topology, as well as the parameters of confirmation bias. Finally, we analyze Nash equilibrium in the scenarios of neutral and extremal group of innate opinions. This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present preliminaries that include notation, social network model, as well as its converged unique equilibrium. In Sections III and IV, we study the existence and value of pure Nash equilibrium, respectively. We next present numerical simulations in Section V. We finally present our conclusions and future research directions in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Notation
Let R n and R m×n denote the set of n-dimensional real vectors and the set of m × n-dimensional real matrices, respectively. N represents the set of the positive integers, and N 0 = N ∪ {0}. We define 1 as the identity matrix with proper dimension. Moreover, we let 1 n denote the vector of all ones. The superscript '⊤' stands for the matrix transposition. For a vector x ∈ R n , x stands for its l 1 norm, i.e.,
The social network considered in this paper is composed of n individuals. The interaction among the individuals is modeled by a digraph G = (V, E), where V = {v 1 , . . . , v n } is the set of vertices representing the individuals and E ⊆ V × V is the set of edges representing the influence structure. Assume that the social network has no self-loops, i.e., for any v i ∈ V,
B. Social Network Model
We now introduce the model of cyber-social network from [5] , [6] to describe the dynamics of opinion evolution in the presence of confirmation bias:
is her fixed innate opinion, h and g are the opinions of competitive information sources u and u, respectively, that satisfy
2) w ij represents the weighted influence of individual v j on individual v i ,
3) w i (x i (k)) and w i (x i (k)) are the state-dependent influence weights of information sources u and u on individual v i that capture "confirmation bias":
4) α i (x i (k)) is referred to as the "resistance parameter" of individual v i , is determined in such a way that it satisfies for ∀i ∈ V and ∀k ∈ N 0 ,
For the innate opinions, let us define:
by which the relation (2) can be equivalently transformed to
We now rewrite (1) in the following vector form:
where we define:
We need to make the following assumption that guarantees the non-negativeness of resistance parameters and statedependent influence weights (3), and the convergence of social dynamics.
Assumption 1: Given W ∈ R n×n , β ∈ R and γ ∈ R, we have:
Theorem 1: Under Assumption 1, the resistance parameters α i (x i (k)) ≥ 0, the state-dependent influence weights w i (x i (k)) ≥ 0 and w i (x i (k) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ V, ∀k ∈ N, and the dynamics (6) converges to a unique equilibrium that is independent of initial opinions.
Proof: See Appendix B.
C. Equilibrium of Social Dynamics
We now define the following matrices to present the equilibrium of social dynamics (1):
Corollary 1: The social dynamics (6) converges to a unique equilibrium:
Proof: See Appendix C.
III. COST FUNCTION In social networks, the innate opinions rely on inherent personal characteristics (e.g., socio-economic conditions in which the individual grew up and/or lives in) [2] , and the social network topology with its coupled influence weights correspond to individuals' inter-personal appraisals that rely on trust and trends to vary little over a long period of time. Hence, through controlling innate opinions and weighted network topology precisely to influence public opinions is not practical. The remaining feasible control variables for the information sources are their own opinions. The weight function (3) and the convex combination (4) indicate that through strategically expressing their opinions, information sources can influence individuals' resistance parameters and the state-dependent weighted influences, consequently, influence public opinions.
The relation (11) , in conjunction with (9) , shows that the public expressed opinions are nonlinear functions of opinions of information sources. Before proceeding on, we first present the following auxiliary lemma that can simplify the analysis of the best responses of competitive information sources.
Lemma 1:
The matrix E defined in (9) satisfies:
where c = [c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ] ⊤ ∈ R n is the eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue λ of W ⊤ , i.e.,
Proof: See Appendix D. Through assigning relative scores to all individuals in network based on the concept that high-scoring individual contributes more influence to her followers' opinion evolutions than low-scoring individual, c in (13) is referred to the vector of out-eigenvector centralities that measures of the importance of an individual in influencing other individuals [11] . Unlike the cost function used for competitive camps that treats individual expressed opinions equally [7] , the cost function f (g, h) considered in this paper comprises individual importance according to the out-eigenvector centrality:
where x * (g, h) is computed via (11) . In this paper, we model the competitive information spread as a zero-sum game with two players Alice and Bob that refer to information sources who forwards opinions h and g, respectively. Obviously, using (14) as the cost function, Alice's objective is to maximize f (g, h), while Bob's objective is to minimize f (g, h).
We now rewrite the cost function in term of control variables, i.e., the opinions of information sources.
Corollary 2: The cost function (14) can be equivalently expressed as:
where
Proof: See Appendix E. To end this section, we give the partial derivatives pertaining to the cost function in (15) .
with
IV. EXISTENCE OF PURE NASH EQUILIBRIUM
A. Zero-Sum Game
The max-min optimization of cost function in general from is written as max h min g {f (g, h)}. In this scenario, Alice expresses her opinion h as leader who knows the rational reaction of follower Bob. We denote the interested strategies for this optimization as the pair (g * , h * ) such that
We note that (26a) indicates the follower Bob knows all of the opinion strategies of the leader Alice, and Bob always takes this into account in computing his best response g * (h). Meanwhile, (26b) implies that the leader Alice knows the best response of the follower Bob, and then expresses her opinion h * that maximizes her payoff, which anticipates the best response of Bob. Bob actually observed this and expressed expected opinion.
The min-max optimization of control objective in general from is written as min 
Equation (27a) indicates the follower Alice knows all of the opinion strategies of the leader Bob, and (27b) implies that the leader Bob knows the best response of Alice, and then expresses his opinion g * that minimizes his payoff, anticipating the predicted best response of Alice.
For the two players Bob and Alice, it is well-known that under their best responses:
B. Existence Problem
Let us first consider the strategic form game:
• I is a finite set of players.
• S i is a non-empty set of available actions for player i.
• u i : S → R is the cost function of player i, where S = i∈I S i . We now present a lemma regarding to the existence of pure Nash equilibrium of games with infinite strategy sets.
Lemma 2: [12] - [14] Consider a strategic form game I, (S i ) i∈I , (u i ) i∈I with infinite strategy sets such that for each i ∈ I: S i is convex and compact, (29)
The game has a pure Nash equilibrium. By Lemma 2 we can conclude the existence of pure Nash equilibrium for the competitive information spread problems (26) and (27), which is formally stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Under (8), the pure Nash equilibrium (g * , h * ) exists for the competitive information spread problems (26) and (27), under which the equality in (28) holds.
Proof: See Appendix F.
V. PURE NASH EQUILIBRIUM
This section investigates the pure Nash equilibrium. We will use the following scalars to describe Nash equilibrium.
from which it verifies that
Using the relations in (32), the Nash equilibrium is presented as follows.
Theorem 3: Under (8), pure Nash equilibrium (g * , h * ) for the competitive information spread problems (26) and (27) exists as
• Otherwise, 
A. Neutral Innate Opinions
For the social network topology, let us refer L ∈ R n×n to its Laplacian matrix, i.e.,
The following corollary formally states that the existence of pure Nash equilibrium in this scenario depends on the group of innate opinions and social network structure.
Corollary 3: If the group of innate opinions and social network topology satisfy
the pure Nash equilibrium exists for the competitive information spread problems (26) and (27) as
Proof: See Appendix H. Remark 1: The condition s = 1 2 in (37) represents the scenario where the mean of the group of innate opinions is neutral. Corollary 3 indicates that in this scenario, Bob's strategy in Nash equilibrium is independent of innate opinions, weighted social network topology and confirmation bias .
B. Extremal Innate Opinions
We note that s = 0 indicate that s = s = 0. Let us substitute s = s = s = 0 into q(0, 0), q(0, 1) and r(0), and denote them byq(0, 0),q(0, 1) andr(0) in this scenario:
It verifies from (21) that m(0, 1) ≥ 0 in this scenario. We straightforwardly obtain the pure Nash equilibrium, which is formally stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 4: If the group of innate opinions satisfies s = 0, the pure Nash equilibrium exists for the competitive information spread problems (26) and (27) as: 
Corollary 5: If the group of innate opinions satisfies s = 1, the pure Nash equilibrium exists for the competitive information spread problems (26) and (27) as (1), 1) , otherwise.
C. No Confirmation Bias
By Example 1, m(0, 1) = q(0, 1) ≥ 0 in the scenario of no confirmation bias.
Corollary 6: When no individual holds confirmation bias towards the opinions of information sources. i.e., γ = 0, the pure Nash equilibrium for the competitive information spread problems (26) and (27) is (g * , h * ) = (0, 1). Remark 2: Corollary 6 indicates that when no individual holds confirmation bias, Nash equilibrium is independent of innate opinions, weighted social network topology, as well the influences from information sources. In this section, we verify the derived strategies in the wellknown Krackhardt's advice network [15] with 21 individuals. The network topology is shown in Fig. 1 
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. In The Absence of Confirmation Bias
For the parameters of confirmation bias, let us set β = 0.06, and γ = 0. We note that γ = 0 indicates that no individual holds confirmation bias toward the opinions of Alice and Bob. By Corollary 6, we obtain the Nash equilibrium in this scenario is (g * , h * ) = (0, 1), which is numerically demonstrated by Fig. 2 (a) .
B. In The Presence of Confirmation Bias
We now consider more realistic situation where individuals hold confirmation bias. For the confirmation bias, we let β = γ = 0.06. It obtains from the innate opinions and social network topology:
By these parameters, we compute from (20) and (21) that q(0, 1) > 0, m(s, 1) < 0 and m(0, 1) < 0. Then, from Theorem 3 we obtain the Nash equilibrium in this scenario as (g * , h * ) = (s, 1) = (0.2, 1) that is demonstrated by Fig. 2  (b) .
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the competitive information spread with confirmation bias over cyber-social networks. Pure Nash equilibrium points are investigated. Theoretical results are verified by numerical examples. There are several directions implied by the factors of competitive strategies for future work; some of which can be listed as follows.
• We will investigate on the exact inference of group innate opinions, social network topology and parameters of confirmation bias.
• We will incorporate group centralities into the cost function to identify the critical group of individuals in information spreading. Proof: The partial derivative of (21) w.r.t. g is straightforwardly obtained as
Noticing the eigenvalue λ given in (13), the condition (8), in conjunction with Geršgorin disk theorem [17] , imply that
which together with (24) and the fact 0 < h < 1 imply that a 2 > 0. Thus, we conclude from (42) that
The partial derivative of (21) w.r.t. h satisfies:
Following the same steps to derive (44) and (45), we obtain from (20) that
By (44) and (46), and (45) and (47), we have
With the consideration of (8), substituting m(0, 1) and q(0, 1) into (48) yields
Lemma 5: Consider f (g, h), q(g, h) and m(g, h)
given by (15) , (20) and (21), respectively. If q(g, h) ≥ 0, m(g,h) ≥ 0, g ≥g and h ≥h, then f (g, h) ≥ f (g,h).
Proof: It follows from (47) that q(g, h) ≥ 0 implies
. Thus, the non-negativeness of state-dependent influence weights (3) directly follows from (8a).
It is straightforward to obtain from the relation (4) that
where (49) is obtained via considering (3). The relation (50) indicates that to guarantee the non-negativeness of α i (x i (k)), we require 1 − j∈V w ij ≥ 2β for any i ∈ V, or equivalently,
Let us denote x i (k + 1) and x i (k) byf i (x i ) and x i , respectively. Then, following from (1) we havẽ
We obtain from (49) that
Moreover, from (3) we have
Combining (52) with (53) and (54) yields
which implies that to guarantee the convergence to a unique equilibrium that is independent of initial opinions (via the well-known Banach fixed-point theorem used in the proof of Theorem 1 in [6] ), we require 4γ + W 1 < 1, or equivalently,
Combining (51) and (56) yields the condition (8b).
APPENDIX C PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
By Theorem 1, the unique equilibrium of the social dynamics (6) is independent of initial opinions, hence we can set g1 n ≥ x(0) ≥ h1 n to solve x * (g, h). In the scenario, under the linear convex combination (4) and the relation (5), we have h1 n ≥ x(k) ≥ g1 n for ∀k, consequently,
With (57), the state-dependent weights (3) at the steady state satisfy:
and the resistant parameters are obtained from (4) as:
Due to the relations (58) and (59), the social dynamics (6) at the steady state is
from which the equilibrium (11) is obtained straightforwardly.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Since W is an adjacency matrix and its transposition does not change its eigenvalues, by Lemma 3 in Appendix A we have (13) . It follows from (9) and (13) that
from which (12) is obtained straightforwardly.
APPENDIX E PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
Substituting (11) and (12) into (14) yields:
which is equivalent to (15) via considering (17) and (16) .
APPENDIX F PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Let us first transform the zero-sum games (26) and (27) to a strategic form game with I = {Alice, Bob}, u Bob (s Bob , s Alice ) = −f (g, h), u Alice (s Alice , s Bob ) = f (g, h), S Bob = [0, s] and S Alice = [s, 1]. In the followings, we only need to prove the conditions in Lemma 2 hold in this setting.
Obviously, both S Bob and S Alice are convex and compact, which satisfies (29).
The relation (15) As Theorem 2 states that Nash equilibrium exists for the games (26) and (27). Therefore, we only need to study minmax or max-min strategy to derive Nash equilibrium. In the proof, we study the max-min problem (26).
Based on (44) and (45), the rest of proof considers five different cases with the following defined scalars:
A. Case:
Due to (44) and (45),
which means f (g, h) is non-decreasing w.r.t. g. Thus, from the definition (26a) we have
Let us insert (64) into (15) and take its derivative w.r.t. h:
where q(0, h) is given by (20). We note that (47) indicates that q(0, h) is non-increasing w.r.t. h. Thus, if q(0, 1) ≥ 0,
If q(0, s) > 0 and q(0, 1) < 0, it verifies from (61) and (20) that q(0, r(0)) = 0. Then, from (65) we have
, which implies h * = r(0). The equilibrium point in this case is summarized as (33).
B. Case: m(s, s) ≤ 0
Due to (44) and (45), m(s, s) ≤ 0 implies that given any h ∈ [s, 1],
, from which and definition (26a) we have g * (h) = s. We now insert g * (h) into (15) and taking its derivative w.r.t. h, we arrive at
Due 
, where w(h) is given by (62). It is straightforward to obtain from (26a) that g * (h) = w(h), whose derivative w.r.t. h is obtained as:
We now replace g in (15) by g * (h) and take its derivative w.r.t. h:
Since g * (h) = w(h) ≥ 0, from (62) we have
Moreover, 1−λ−hγ −(1−λ−β) = β −hγ ≥ 0, which means 1−λ−hγ ≥ 1−λ−β. Then, noticing (72) and (43), we arrive
If r 1 r 4 − r 2 ≤ 0, it follows from (71) and (73) that
where the last inequality considers (43) and (8a). Let us denote w max = max i∈V { j∈V w ij }. From (17) and (16) we have:
Then, it obtains from (71) that
where (77) 
where δ(0) is given by (60). It follows from (44) and (81b) that m(g, h) > 0 for h ∈ [s, δ(0)) and g ∈ [0, s]. Thus, we have g * = 0. Then, following the same analysis in Subsection A, we arrive at 
where δ(g) is given by (60). The derivative of δ(g) w.r.t. g is obtained from (60) as:
where the inequality is obtained via considering (43). Obviously, (87) indicates that δ(g) is strictly increasing w.r.t. g. Thus, δ(s) ≥ δ(0). It verifies from (21) with (60) that m(0, δ(0)) = 0 and m(s, δ(s)) = 0, which respectively imply m(0, h) ≤ 0 and m(s, h) ≥ 0 for h ∈ [δ(0), δ(s)] (that is due to (45)). Then, following the same analysis in subsection C, we obtain
Noticing (19), we obtain from (86b) that g * = s for h ∈ [δ(s), 1] Then, following the same analysis in subsection B, we arrive at
We note that due to (46), q(s, δ(s)) ≤ 0 implies q(s, 1) ≤ 0, which, in conjunction with m(s, 1) < 0, results in a contradiction with Lemma 4. Thus, the conditions of the second and the third items in (89) do not hold. Thus, (89) is degenerated as
by Lemma 5 we obtain f (s, 1) ≥ f (w(δ(s)), δ(s)) and f (s, 1) ≥ f (0, δ(0)), which, in conjunction with (83), (88) 
If m(0, s) > 0, we have m(g, s) > 0 for g ∈ [0, s], which is due to (44). We note m(s, 1) < 0 implies that m(g, 1) < 0 for g ∈ [0, s]. Here, we conclude (86). Considering (19), we obtain from (86a) that g * = 0 for h ∈ [s, δ(0)] Then, following the same analysis in Subsection A, we arrive at 
With the consideration of (13), we have i∈V c i j∈V
Noticing the condition s = 1 2 and the definitions (17) and (16), multiplying both sides of (101) by
Inserting s = Then, we straightforwardly obtain (38) from the first three items in (33).
